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Abstract 
The existing empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive with respect to a number of the key 
predictions of the agency model.  Although the reach of agency theory is considerably wider, the 
dominant portion of work has been taken up with examining the nature of the trade-off between 
risk and incentives, and the implications thereof for contractual design. More specifically, some 
researchers have recently noted that the predicted trade-off between risk and incentives turns out 
to be rather weak, and perhaps non-existent, when confronted with the available empirical 
evidence.  In this paper, we examine the risk-incentives trade-off and related predictions from 
agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We 
find that the relation between the use of performance pay in these firms and the environmental 
uncertainty they confront  which is one way to test the risk/incentives tradeoff  is indeed 
weak and in many cases even perverse. We then suggest, in line with other recent contributions 
to the literature, that this may be caused by the widespread use of delegation. One effect of 
delegation is that it breaks the simple relation between risks and incentives. We examine the 
suggestion that that those firms that are more prone to use delegation of decision rights in their 
internal organization are facing an uncertain environment to a larger extent than the rest of the 
population. We argue that this constitutes an indirect confirmation of the hypothesis. We also 
examine the multi-tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is 
restricted. We fail to find support for this hypothesis. It is suggested that the reason for this 
finding is also related to delegation.   
 
Key words: Uncertainty, pay-for-performance, delegation, innovation, competition 
.  
JEL Codes: C35, L23 
 
 
Acknowledgments   
The comments of Brian Silverman and Nick Argyres on an earlier version of this paper are 
gratefully acknowledged. In addition, we wish to thank the participants in the DISKO project at 
Aalborg University for allowing us to use the data applied in this paper. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
 
 
ISBN 87-7873-130-5  
 I. Introduction 
 
Empirical work in agency theory is relatively scant, at least when compared to the 
abundance of theoretical papers that have appeared since the mid-nineteen-seventies 
(Masten and Saussier, 2002), and to the rather large and cumulative body of empirical work 
in related areas, notably transaction cost economics (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Moreover, 
the existing empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive with respect to a number of the 
key predictions of the agency model.  Although the reach of agency theory is considerably 
wider, the dominant portion of the extant empirical work has been taken up with examining 
the nature of the trade-off between risk and incentives, and the implications thereof for 
contractual design, including the design of organizations and institutions.  However, as 
Prendergast (1999; 2000) notes, the empirical relation between risk and incentives is 
“tenuous.” Many, perhaps most, other predictions from agency theory have not been 
subjected to empirical scrutiny.  For example, multi-tasking agency theory (Holmström and 
Milgrom, 1991) predicts that an agent’s flexibility (i.e., the number of tasks that he is 
allowed to engage in) will be restricted, the less reliable the performance measures for his 
main tasks become. Increasing environmental uncertainty may produce this effect.  This 
prediction has, to our knowledge, never been tested.1   
 In this paper, we undertake to examine the risk-incentives trade-off on the basis of 
data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We find that the relation 
between the use of performance pay in these firms and the uncertainty they confront  
which is one way to test the risk/incentives tradeoff  is indeed “tenuous.” We then 
suggest, in line with, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1992), Mendelsson and Pillai 
(1999), and Prendergast (2000) that this may be caused by the widespread use of delegation. 
An effect of delegation is breaking the simple relation between risks and incentives. We 
move on to examine indications that suggest that firms that are more prone to use delegation 
of decision rights in their internal organization are also those firms that face a more 
uncertain environment than the rest of the population. We argue that this constitutes an 
indirect confirmation of the hypothesis. We also examine the multitasking agency 
hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted (Holmström and 
 
1 
Milgrom, 1991). We fail to find support for this hypothesis. We suggest that the reason for 
this finding is also related to the issue of delegation.   
 
II. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Basic Agency Theory 
We here briefly and simply restate the basics of the agency model (following the now 
standard model of Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Consider a “task” with output, x. x 
depends on the agent’s effort, e, and a normal error term, ε, which has mean, µ, and 
variance, σ2, so that x = e + ε. µ, σ2 and x are common knowledge for the agent who and 
principal. e is unobservable to the principal and σ2 is uncontrollable for the agent. x is 
verifiable, so that contracts, s(x), specifying the payment from principal to agent can be 
(costlessly) written. The agent’s preferences may be described by the exponential utility 
function, -exp[-r (s (x) – c (e))], where r is the coefficient of risk aversion and c (e) is the 
agent’s cost function.  
 In the standard formulation, the principal’s problem is to choose s so that the agent 
puts effort forward and is not overly burdened with risk. Under certain assumptions (stated 
in Holmström and Milgrom, 1987), the second-best contract takes a linear form, s (x) = αx 
+ β, where α is a measure of how “high-powered” incentives are and β is simply an income 
transfer from the principal to the agent (which serves to satisfy the participation constraint). 
Maximizing the certainty equivalent of joint surplus, which is u + µ - ½rα2 σ2 – c (e), 
subject to the agent’s first order condition, c’(e) = α, yields the best choice of α. Holmström 
(1989) gives the example of assuming c (e) = ½ke2, which yields α = (1 + krσ2 )-1 . 
Inspection of this expression reveals that the agent receives a higher share, the lower his 
aversion to risk is and vice versa (α, the “piece rate,” and r, the coefficient of risk aversion 
varies inversely), and that incentives (α) and variance (σ2) also vary inversely. This is the 
tradeoff between risk-sharing and provision of incentives to supply effort.  
 The standard model may be extended in various ways, notably by introducing 
monitoring considerations. In the above setting, higher risk leads to more monitoring, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1 At least directly. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) invoke earlier work by Anderson (1985) and Anderson and 
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because higher risk leads to a fall in α, which in turn reduces effort, prompting an increase 
in monitoring. The provision of incentives may also be influenced by changing the agent’s 
opportunity costs, that is, controlling which other activities he can engage in, for how long 
time, etc. Intuitively, the less restricted an agent is  that is, the more discretion he has with 
respect to his choice of which activities to engage in and for how long  the more costly it 
is to induce him to work on a specific project.  Consequently, the costs of providing 
incentives may be reduced by restricting the set of activities that an agent is allowed to work 
on (Holmström and Milgrom, 1990). The costs of measuring the agent’s performance in the 
various activities play a key role for how much the agent will be restricted, as clarified by 
Holmström and Milgrom (1991). A key prediction from their multitask-agency model is that 
the more costly it is to measure the agent’s performance in his main activities, the more his 
flexibility will be restricted. Since risk and measurement cost can reasonably be assumed to 
correlate directly, this train of thought would seem to predict that as risk increases, the agent 
will tend to become increasingly constrained. An interpretation is that activities will tend to 
be clustered in those activities that are easily measurable, and those that are not; different 
kind of incentives will be provided for each.  
Empirical Work  
In agency theory, environmental uncertainty has the effect of adding observation error 
(increase measurement cost) to performance measures (Holmström, 1979; Holmström and 
Milgrom, 1991; Prendergast, 2000). This increases the risk that is imposed on agents. 
Hence, the testable prediction is that risk and performance pay correlate negatively. 
However, as Prendergast (2000) documents at length, this prediction has not fared quite well 
in the face of the empirical evidence. Specifically, he considers the empirical evidence for 
the four classes of occupation of executives, sharecroppers, franchisees, and salesforce 
workers. In the case of executive compensation, the evidence is “inconclusive,” although 
there is weak evidence for relative performance evaluation, an implication of the 
risk/incentives tradeoff. For sharecroppers, the fraction that they retain turns out to be 
increasing in the noisiness of financial returns that is directly counter to the agency 
prediction. Evidence from franchising studies suggest that the choice of whether to keep 
outlets in-house or franchise them is influenced by uncertainty in a direction opposite to the 
prediction of agency theory, that is, the probability of choosing franchising is positively 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Schmittlein (1984) as indirectly yielding empirical support for their multitask agency model. 
 
3 
influenced by environmental uncertainty. The evidence on salesforce integration is 
inconclusive. In sum, the empirical evidence would, on balance, seem to indicate that 
uncertainty and incentives are positively, rather than negatively, related.  This directly 
contradicts the basic agency model. 
Resolving the Uncertainty/Performance Relation  
A strong candidate for explaining why the basic agency prediction seems to be falsified in 
the light of the empirical evidence is that basic agency theory fails to consider the many 
benefits of delegation (Foss and Foss, 2002). Indeed, in the basic story, the only benefit of 
delegation seems to be economizing with the opportunity costs of the principal’s time. If 
these were low or zero, the principal would carry out the task himself, particularly since 
differences in knowledge about how to optimally carry out the task do not seem to exist. 
 In actuality, of course, much knowledge about how to optimally carry out the task 
resides with the agent, and may be too costly to transfer to corporate headquarters (or other 
managerial layers), because of problems of eliciting the correct information or simply 
because the relevant is of a highly “impacted,” tacit or complex, kind. Agents then have 
“real authority,” in the sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997). In this situation, delegation co-
locates decision rights with this knowledge. The attendant moral hazard problem may be 
reduced by using more output-based contracts. Organizational structure and reward 
mechanisms arguably reflects the relevant tradeoff (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). Thus, the 
choice of how to remunerate agents is one that is complementary to a host of other issues of 
organizational design.   
 As Prendergast (2000) points out, this kind of reasoning may help explain why we 
may, in fact, expect a positive relation between uncertainty and incentives; thus, as he notes, 
“… uncertain environments result in the delegation of responsibilities, which in turn 
generates incentive pay based on output” (Prendergast, 2000: 1). Thus, in stable 
environments, direct order-giving and input monitoring will be employed by the principal. 
In more uncertain environments, the principal may still be able to monitor the agent’s 
activities, but will have less of an idea of which activities the agent should optimally work 
on and how these activities should be balanced. Information about these issues may reside 
with the agent rather than with the principal. In this situation, principals likely respond by 
offering output-based performance contracts (Barzel, 1997).  
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 Clearly, we should expect the incidence and strength of the relation between 
environmental uncertainty and performance pay to be firm or industry dependent. There are 
a priori grounds for suspecting that it may be stronger in “high-tech,” “dynamic,” 
“turbulent,” etc. firms and industries than in the more traditional ones. We offer two 
complementary explanations for this. 
  First, the use of delegation is likely to be more prevalent in the former kind of 
industries than in the latter (Mendelson and Pillai, 1999). There are number of reasons for 
this. “High-tech,” “dynamic,” etc. industries are more likely to require speedy decision-
making on the part of incumbent firms. This is a force pulling in the direction of delegation. 
Moreover, in such industries, principals are likely to be more uncertain about how agents 
should optimally carry out tasks than in more traditional industries. This also fosters 
delegation, as explained above.  
 A second, complementary, reason why we would expect the incidence and strength of 
the uncertainty-incentives link to be stronger in “high-tech” firms and industries is that these 
are likely to make more use of multi-tasking than more traditional firms and industries. 
Notably, organizational practices such as planned job rotation and quality circles introduce 
multitasking environments. However, these are also the firms and industries for which 
uncertainty is already high, relatively more output-based pay being used in response. 
Multitasking aggravates this, since it adds to the difficulty of accurately measuring input 
performance, and makes it even more attractive to substitute output-based pay for direct 
monitoring and other ways of restricting the agent. This contradicts the Holmstrom and 
Milgrom hypothesis that increasing risk under multitasking lead to restriction of the number 
of activities that an agent is allowed to work on: Given that output-based pay is preferred 
under these circumstances, there is little reason to implement such restrictions. On the 
contrary, “dynamic” firms often stimulate multitasking for reasons of knowledge-integration 
and sharing.  
Hypotheses 
A number of hypotheses may be derived from the above discussion. The first one is simply 
that as a general matter, the uncertainty/incentive relation is a positive one.  This relation is 
not directly asserted by Prendergast, who merely lists the relevant empirical evidence and 
tries to rationalize based on that. However, the evidence he mentions is derived from rather 
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different kinds of occupations (and underlying industries) which makes it relevant to 
consider whether the relation may in fact be a general one. Thus, we suggest that  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is an overall positive and significant relation between 
environmental uncertainty and the use of performance pay.  
 
Still, we would expect the strength of the correlation to vary between firms belonging to 
different industries, for the reasons given above.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The strength of the correlation between environmental uncertainty and 
the use of performance pay is sector dependent, so that firms in more “dynamic” 
sectors are more likely to use performance pay than those in less “dynamic” sectors, 
given a certain level of uncertainty.  
 
The underlying “mechanism” driving the positive relation between uncertainty and 
incentives is, as his been argued, delegation. Thus, based on the above, we would expect the 
following hypothesis to hold true.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Delegation and environmental uncertainty are positively correlated.  
 
Finally, we submit that contrary to the predictions from multitasking agency theory, firms in 
“dynamic,” high-uncertainty industries far from refraining from the use of multitasking, 
such firms will actually use multitasking more frequently: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that are placed in environments characterized by high 
uncertainty will restrict the activities that their employees can engage in less than 
those that are placed in low uncertainty environments.  
 
We examine these hypotheses empirically in the remainder of the paper.2  
                                                          
2 Our hypotheses relate to issues of complementarity among organizational elements, since we argue that high-
powered performance incentives are complementary to delegation. Athey and Stern (1998) discuss the 
challenges of empirically identifying complementarities in organization form.  They note how difficult it is 
to argue that practice A is complementary with characteristic B even if A and B usually appear jointly in 
organizations, but offer methodologies that may handle this problem. Admittedly, in this paper we do not try 
 
6 
 III. Empirical analysis 
 
Measures 
While the use of pay-for-performance, delegation of responsibility and multitasking can be 
approximated relatively well by the use of questionnaires (see for instance, Mendelson and 
Pillai, 1999; Capelli and Neumark, 2001; Laursen and Foss, forthcoming), or, by observing 
contracts, the measurement of uncertainty is a more difficult endeavor.3 In the empirical 
agency literature various measures has been used to gauge the level of uncertainty facing the 
relevant agent. In the sub-section on “Empirical Work” in Section II of this paper, we 
briefly mentioned the four types of occupation, considered in the empirical agency literature 
(executives, sharecroppers, franchisees, and salesforce workers). In some of this literature, 
the measure of environmental uncertainty is idiosyncratic/specific to the activity in question. 
Such an idiosyncratic measure has been used in the case of  for instance  the analysis of 
franchising decisions, where the average proportion of discontinued outlets in the 
franchising sector in which the franchisor operates, has been adopted (Lafontaine, 1992). 
Another example of a specific measure is the number of calls it takes to close a sale, 
averaged across the salespeople at the responding firm (Coughlan and Narasimhan, 1992).4 
For the analysis of sharecroppers, the coefficient of variation of yield has been used (Allan 
and Lueck, 1992). In addition to the specific measures of uncertainty, variation over time of 
aggregate sales data has been applied in some studies (Norton, 1987; Martin, 1988) as well 
survey-based data, assessing the stability in sales and forecasting accuracy (John and Weitz, 
1989). In the literature on executive pay, the most commonly used proxy for risk or 
uncertainty is variation in returns (see for instance, Lambert and Larker, 1987; Sloan, 1992; 
Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1996). It should be pointed out, however, that since 
managers are to some extent capable of controlling variations in sales, stock returns or 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to tackle this issue in any direct way.   However, indirectly we address the issue by noting that the two key 
complementary variables, that is, pay for performance and delegation, both vary with measures of 
uncertainty.    
3 However, note that our measure of performance pay only concerns the percentage of employees that are 
given performance pay.  Thus, how high-powered incentives are from the perspective of the individual 
employees is, strictly speaking, not captured by this measure.  
4 The argument is that the longer it takes to close a sale the more important is sales efforts and the less 
important is environmental uncertainty (Coughlan and Narasimhan, 1992: 106). 
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profitability, not all of the variance will reflect uncertainty (Lafontaine, 1992; Bushman, 
Indjejikian and Smith, 1996). 
 We here consider three measures of uncertainty, namely, (i) the extent to which firms are 
innovative, (ii) the perceived increase in the level of competition, (iii) within industry 
variance in profitability. We include different measures reflecting uncertainty, since all such 
measures are imperfect. With respect to innovative activity as a measure of uncertainty, it is 
known that innovation involves the lack of knowledge about the precise cost and outcomes 
of different alternatives in addition to lack of knowledge of what the alternatives are 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Freeman and Soete, 1997). However, it may be argued that 
innovation is an uncertain activity in the rare event of major “break-troughs”, while more 
pedestrian incremental innovation in terms of smaller improvements are in fact routinized 
and hence reasonably predictable. Yet, empirical evidence has shown (Mansfield et al., 
1977) that even when the fundamental knowledge base and the expected directions of 
advance are fairly well known, it is still often the case that firms must first engage in 
exploratory research, development and design before the outcome will be known, what 
some manageable result will cost, or even, whether useful results will emerge. As Giovanni 
Dosi (1988: 1134) argues “... even in the case of “normal” technical search (as opposed too 
the “extraordinary” exploration associated with the quest for new paradigms) strong 
uncertainty is present.” Since innovation is not important to all firms, and since it only 
partially reflects environmental uncertainty, we include the two other measures. With regard 
to the (increased) level of competition, the idea is that if the level of competition increases, 
then the selection environment of the firm becomes tougher and the room for managerial 
slack becomes smaller. Hence, if the level of competition increases, the firm will become 
more dependent on the (uncertain) actions of the competitors. The final measure is the more 
conventional measure of uncertainty used in the existing literature, namely within-industry 
variance in profitability. 
The Empirical Model 
Based on the discussion above the probability of introducing a certain organizational 
practice may be specified as follows: 
).,( 21 xzfo ββ= (1) 
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 Here, o is the probability of adopting an organizational practice to a certain extent 
within the firm, β1 and β2 are parameter vectors, and z is a set of (exogenous) determinants 
of the application of certain organizational practices, related to environmental uncertainty, 
while x is a set of other variables explaining the adoption of a certain organizational practice 
across business firms. The model may be made operational in the following way: 
 
,
..0
ii
iiii
PROFITVARCOMP
INNOSUBSIDSIZESECT)jOProb(
ε+ω+ψ
+η+ϕ+α+χ==
(2) 
  
 where Prob(Oi = 0..j) expresses the firms’ probability of adopting a given 
organizational practice (such as pay-for-performance or delegation of responsibility) to a 
certain degree within the firm (“0” = no use, “1” = less than 25% of the workforce involved, 
“2” = 25-50% of the workforce, and “3” = more than 50% of the workforce involved). We 
control for firm size (SIZE) and for sectoral affiliation (SECT). We include three sector 
categories (see the paragraph below for a description). Finally, we control for whether or not 
the firm is a subsidiary of a larger firm (SUBSID), since decisions on the adoption of 
organizational practices may  at least partly  be decided at the level of the headquarter. 
The three measures of uncertainty include the level of novelty of the innovations produced 
by the firm in question (INNO) and the firm’s perceived change in the level of competition 
(COMP) and the within-industry variance in profitability (PROFITVAR).  For the possible 
values of INNO and COMP variables, see Table 1 below. The calculation of PROFITVAR 
is based on register data from Statistics Denmark. The basis of the variable is firm 
profitability measured as firm profits divided by firm value added. The firms in the sample 
have been classified according to industry at the level of eighty-three industries by Statistics 
Denmark (see Appendix 2 to this paper). However, given the fact that there is a very small 
number of firms in some industries only, the industries have been aggregated up to a total of 
seventy industries, in the cases were this seemed meaningful (see appendix Table 3 for 
details of the aggregation). Since relatively complete data are available for the years 1992, 
1993 and 1994, all firms with non-missing profit data for all of the three years are included 
in the analysis (in order to get a balanced panel). The number of firms with non-missing 
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profit data are 1610 firms5, and hence we have 4830 observations on which to base the 
variance-in-profits variable. Based on those observations, the within-industry (seventy 
industries) variance is calculated, resulting in the PROFITVAR variable.6 It follows from 
the hypotheses stated in Section II, that we expect positive signs for the “uncertainty” 
variables. 
 The sectoral classification is key to Hypothesis 2 of this paper, since we claim that 
firms in more “dynamic” sectors use performance pay than those in less “dynamic” sectors” 
for given levels of uncertainty (measured as innovation or increase in the level of 
competition). Details of the sectoral classification applied may be found in Appendix 2 to 
this paper. Firm types with the strongest internal capacity to develop new products and 
services are assumed to belong to “high knowledge-intensive industries” (see Laursen, 
2002). Firms in such industries are producing specialized machinery and instrumentation, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) 
services — the latter including banking, accounting, consultancies, advertising etc. 
Industries associated with the lowest capacity to develop new products and services 
internally (“low knowledge-intensity industries”) are assumed to be the construction 
industry, retailing, cleaning, and to some extent supplier dominated manufacturing 
industries (furniture, textiles, pulp, paper and paper products etc.). Scale-intensive 
manufacturing industries (bulk materials and assembly) and firms in the wholesale trade 
industry may be considered to be intermediate in relation to knowledge-intensity (“medium 
knowledge-intensity industries”). Based on this sectoral classification, we estimate the 
following model in order to test hypothesis 2:  
(3) 
,
..0
isis
sisisisi
PROFITVARCOMP
INNOSUBSIDSIZESECT)jOProb(
ε+ω+ψ
+η+ϕ+α+χ==
  
 where the notation is the same as in Equation (2). Footsign S indicates that the 
parameter is allowed to vary, depending on to which sector each firm belongs.  
                                                          
5  Note that in the calculation of the within-industry variance in profits, we use all the possible observations 
available in the dataset. This contrasts to the econometric estimations to be found later in this paper, where 
we include the firms with more than 30 employees only (993 firms). 
6  It can been observed from Appendix Table 3, that there are two industries still  (research & development and 
legal activities) in each of which there is only one firm present with non-missing profit data for all of the 
three years. However, in the estimations it does not matter significantly for the results whether or not these 
two industries are included in the analysis. 
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The Data 
The main source of data for this paper is the DISKO database. The database is based on a 
questionnaire that aims at tracing the relationship between technical and organizational 
innovation in a way that permits an analysis of new principles for work organization and 
their implications for the use and development of the employee's qualifications in firms in 
the Danish private business sector. The survey was carried out by the DISKO project at 
Aalborg University (DK) in 1996. The questionnaire was submitted to a national sample of 
4,000 firms selected among manufacturing firms with at least 20 full-time employees and 
non-manufacturing firms with at least 10 full-time employees. Furthermore, all Danish firms 
with at least 100 employees were included in the sample, i.e. a total of 913 firms. The 
resulting numbers of respondents were 684 manufacturing and 1,216 non-manufacturing 
firms, corresponding to response rates of 52 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively.  
 The first descriptive analysis of the survey can be found in Gjerding and Lund (1996) 
and in Gjerding (1997). The database is held by Statistics Denmark, and the data on the 
firms in the database can be linked to regular register data that are also held by Statistics 
Denmark.  For the purposes of the present paper, data have been obtained on the size and 
profitability of the firms in the sample from regular register data.  The choice was made to 
work only with firms with more than 30 employees, since we are dealing with the 
application of formal work practices — practices which are simply less meaningful for 
smaller companies (why use delegation, if the firm is not larger than a typical work team?). 
By retaining only firms in the sample that are larger than 30 employees, we end up with a 
total of 993 firms.  
 Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. Appendix 1 
can be inspected for a description of the questions from the survey on the basis of which the 
variables have been constructed. Only about 10 per cent of the firms do not use delegation 
of responsibility (10.4 per cent) to varying degrees, while just about half of the firms in the 
sample apply pay-for-performance (52.9 per cent). Also about half of the firms report use of 
quality circles (47.4) and planned job rotation (44.6). Most firms (79.3 per cent) feel that the 
level of competition has increased over recent years. While it is clearly observed that the 
perceived level of competition is highly skewed, it is also evident that the perceived 
increased level of competition varies in degree. The sample includes 391 non-innovators, 
434 firms that produced products/services that were new only to the firm itself, 89 firms that 
 
11 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for a set of DISKO variables (N = 993) 
 
  Number of 
firms 
% of sample
 Industry affiliation Low-KI  390 39.3 
  Medium-KI 366 36.9 
  High-KI 237 23.9 
 Number of employees 31-100 employees 312 31.4 
 (SIZE) 101-200 employees 203 20.4 
  200+ employees 478 48.1 
 Subsidiary No 409 41.2 
 (SUBSID) Yes 584 58.8 
 Competition Strongly decreased 1 0.1 
 (COMP) Somewhat decreased 10 1.0 
  Unchanged 194 19.5 
  Somewhat increased 339 34.1 
  Strongly increased 449 45.2 
 Product innovation No innovation 391 39.4 
 (INNO) Innovation new to the firm 434 43.7 
  Innovation new to the country 89 9.0 
  Innovation new to the world 79 8.0 
 Pay-for-performance Not used 525 52.9 
 (PPAY) < 25% of the workforce 194 19.5 
  25-50% of the workforce 79 8.0 
  > 50% of the workforce 195 19.6 
 Delegation Not used 103 10.4 
 (DR) < 25% of the workforce 240 24.2 
  25-50% of the workforce 265 26.7 
  > 50% of the workforce 385 38.8 
 Quality circles Not used 522 52.6 
 (QC) < 25% of the workforce 264 26.6 
  25-50% of the workforce 111 11.2 
  > 50% of the workforce 96 9.7 
 Planned job rotation Not used 550 55.4 
 (PJR) < 25% of the workforce 288 29.0 
  25-50% of the workforce 93 9.4 
  > 50% of the workforce 62 6.2 
 
 
produced products/services that were new to the national market, while 79 firms introduced 
products/services that were new to the world. 
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Estimation  
Since the dependent variable is a discrete and inherently ordered multinomial-choice 
variable, an ordered probit model is applied as the means of estimation (for an exposition of 
ordered probit models, see Greene, 1997: 926-931). Table 2 contains the estimations 
relevant to hypotheses 1, 3 and 4, while the relevant estimations to hypothesis 2 are to be 
found in Table 3. The marginal effects corresponding to the coefficients found in Table 2 
are reported in Appendix Tables A1-A4, while marginal effects corresponding to the 
coefficients reported in Table 3 are to be found in Appendix Tables A5. The null hypothesis 
that the slopes of the explanatory variables are zero is strongly rejected by the likelihood 
ratio test in all of the four models (i-vi) from Table 2, as well as for the model estimated in 
Table 3. Model (i), in Table 2, tests Hypothesis 1 (“There is an overall positive and 
significant relation between environmental uncertainty and the use of performance pay”). It 
can be seen from the estimation of model (i) that being a subsidiary increases the probability 
of adopting pay-for-performance to an increasing degree. This conclusion can be made, 
based on the fact that the parameter for SUBSID is positive and significant and since the 
marginal effect for the SUBSID variable is negative (see Appendix Table A1) only in the 
case of no use (PPAY=0), while the marginal effect is positive in the case of at all levels of 
adoption (PPAY=1, 2, 3). It can also be noted that the marginal effects are particularly large 
in the case of PPAY = 3. The SIZE variable is insignificant. Of our three uncertainty 
measures, the parameter for increased level of competition is insignificant. In contrast, 
parameter for the innovation variable (INNO) is significant and the marginal effect is 
negative only in the case of no use of pay-for-performance. The effect is by far strongest in 
the case of PPAY = 3 (> 50% of the workforce involved). Moreover, the parameter for 
PROFITVAR is very significant and has the right sign, according to Hypothesis 1. Also in 
this case, the marginal effect is negative only in the case of no use of pay-for-performance 
(PPAY = 0). Here, the effect is strongly negative, while the effect is strongly positive in the 
case of PPAY = 3. In sum, we find rather strong support for Hypothesis 1.  
 Hypothesis 2 (“The strength of the correlation between environmental uncertainty and 
the use of performance pay is sector dependent, so that firms in more “dynamic” sectors 
are more likely to use performance pay than those in less “dynamic” sectors, given a 
certain level of uncertainty”) is put under scrutiny in Table 3, where the parameters are 
allowed to differ for each variable, according to whether the firms belong to low, medium, 
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 Table 2: Probit estimation explaining the adoption of four work practices (N = 993) 
 
  Model(i)  Model (ii)  Model (iii)  Model (iv) 
Dependent variable PPAY DR QC PJR
 Independent variables (Pay-for-performance)  (Delegation of responsibility)  (Quality circles)  (Planned job rotation)
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
 LOW_KI -0.478 0.004 0.640 0.000 -0.568 0.000 -0.775 0.000
 MEDIUM_KI -0.407 0.014 0.837 0.000 -0.527 0.002 -0.627 0.000
 HIGH_KI -0.493 0.005 0.906 0.000 -0.290 0.100 -0.715 0.000
 SIZE 0.011 0.140 0.010 0.137 0.011 0.110 0.019 0.005
 SUBSID 0.209 0.006 0.122 0.096 0.278 0.000 0.138 0.075
 INNO 0.163 0.000 0.067 0.103 0.098 0.023 0.153 0.000
 COMP -0.008 0.861 0.093 0.033 0.031 0.501 0.083 0.076
 PROFITVAR 3.051 0.000 1.536 0.287 1.316 0.204 1.187 0.300
 Log likelihood -1148.7 -1271.7 -1131.5 -1051.4
 Restricted log likelihood -1168.8 -1289.1 -1152.9 -1073.6
 Likelihood ratio test 40.1 34.6 42.9 44.6
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or high knowledge intensive sectors. SIZE is again insignificant  and even more so as 
compared to the case, where a single parameter was assumed. Being a subsidiary of a larger 
firm increases the probability of adopting pay-for performance for what concerns low and 
high knowledge intensive sectors, whereas the parameter is insignificant with respect to 
medium knowledge intensive firms. The marginal effects are particularly strong for PPAY = 
3 (> 50% of the workforce involved), both for low and high knowledge intensive sectors 
(see Appendix Table A5). Again  as when a common parameter was assumed  COMP 
is insignificant. However, the second uncertainty variable, INNO is positive, significant and 
the marginal effects are negative only in the case of no use of PPAY, for all of the three 
sectors. Nevertheless, the size of the parameter for the high knowledge intensive sector is 
about twice the size of the parameters for the two other sectors, and marginal effects are also 
much stronger for the high knowledge intensive sector  in particular for PPAY = 3 (see 
Appendix Table A5). In other words, if firms produce innovations to an increasing degree of 
novelty, they are much more likely to adopt pay-for-performance involving the majority of 
the workforce and this relationship is the strongest for firms affiliated to high knowledge-
intensity sectors. When it comes to the profit-variance measure (PROFITVAR), we find that 
the results are strongly consistent with hypothesis 2 of this paper, since the parameter is 
significant in the case of medium and high knowledge intensive firms. Moreover the 
parameter is larger for high knowledge intensive firms than for medium knowledge 
intensive firms. For both of the two significant types of firms interpretation of the 
parameters is straight-forward, since the marginal effects are negative only in the case of no 
use of PPAY. Overall, the findings give strong support to Hypothesis 2.   
 Model (ii) in Table 2 examines Hypothesis 3 (“Delegation and environmental 
uncertainty are positively correlated”). In this case, SUBSID is significant, but the relevant 
marginal effects (see Appendix, Table A2) are only positive in the case of DR = 3. That is, 
firms affiliated to a larger firm are only more prone do adopt delegation of responsibility 
when more than 50 per cent of the employees are involved. In fact, the marginal effect is 
high and negative if less than 25 per cent of the workforce is involved. The parameter for 
INNO just escapes the ten per cent level of significance, and again, the marginal effect is 
only positive for what concerns PPAY = 3 (> 50% of the workforce involved). Another 
measure reflecting levels of uncertainty, COMP is significant at the five per cent level, but 
once more the marginal effect is positive only for what concerns PPAY = 3. In other words, 
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Table 3: Probit estimation explaining the adoption of pay-for-performance, sectoral 
estimation (N = 993) 
 
  Estimate p-value  
 INTERCEPT Low-KI -0.584 0.017  
  Medium-KI -0.068 0.811  
  High-KI -1.296 0.000  
 SIZE Low-KI -0.009 0.749  
  Medium-KI 0.008 0.397  
  High-KI 0.022 0.427  
 SUBSID Low-KI 0.318 0.011  
  Medium-KI 0.081 0.530  
  High-KI 0.279 0.076  
 INNO Low-KI 0.140 0.073  
  Medium-KI 0.125 0.065  
  High-KI 0.260 0.003  
 COMP Low-KI 0.045 0.540  
  Medium-KI -0.117 0.141  
  High-KI 0.099 0.324  
 PROFITVAR Low-KI 1.014 0.415  
  Medium-KI 6.754 0.019  
  High-KI 9.153 0.006  
 Log likelihood -1141.0   
 Restricted log likelihood -1168.8   
 Likelihood ratio test 55.5   
 
 
 
firms facing tougher competition are more likely to adopt delegation of responsibility only 
when more than 50 per cent of the employees are involved in the delegation. The parameter 
for PROFITVAR has the expected sign, but is not significant. To conclude on Hypothesis 2, 
it can be said that the hypothesis finds support to the extent that if firms face more 
competitive environments, then they are more likely to use delegation of responsibility, 
conditional on whether delegation involves the majority of the workforce. 
 With respect to hypothesis 4 (“Firms that are placed in environments characterized by 
high uncertainty will restrict the activities that their employees can engage in less than 
those that are placed in low uncertainty environments”), we apply two measures of 
“multitasking.” The first has to do with the use of “quality circles” (QC), while the second 
has to do with the application of “planned job rotation”. In both cases we argue that those 
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work practices allows for more multitasking, and hence restrict the employees less. The 
relevant estimations can be found in models (iii) and (vi) in Table 2. In these two models, 
the marginal effects for all variables (except for the three intercepts) are negative (see 
Appendix Table A3-A4) only in the case of no use (QC, PJR = 0), while the marginal 
effects are positive in the case of at all levels of adoption (QC, PJR = 1, 2, 3). SIZE is 
insignificant in the case of QC, while it is positive and significant for what concerns PJR. 
Hence, in the latter situation, larger firms seem more likely to adopt planned job rotation. 
SUBSID is positive and significant in both models, meaning that firms belonging to a larger 
firm are more likely to use quality circles, as well as planned job rotation. INNO is positive 
and significant in both models as well, implying that firms with the ability to produce 
(uncertain) innovations are more prone to adopt QC and PJR. The other proxy for 
uncertainty, COMP, is significant at the ten per cent level in affecting the likelihood of 
adopting planned job rotation, while it is insignificant when confronting quality circles. In 
other words, firms which perceive a tougher competition regime are more likely to adopt 
quality planned job rotation. In sum, the evidence is somewhat supportive of hypothesis 4. 
 
IV. Concluding Discussion 
This paper began by observing the seemingly tenuous tradeoff between risk and uncertainty. 
We then went on to suggest  in line with other authors  that this may be caused by the 
widespread use of delegation of decision rights. Moreover, we argued firms should restrict 
their employees less, when faced with a more uncertain environment. This prediction is in 
contrast to the prediction of the standard agency theory. Subsequently, we made an attempt 
to shed light on these matters empirically, as empirical research on these matters may be 
characterized as relatively scant. It was further argued that firms’ ability to produce 
innovations of an increasing degree of novelty, and firms’ perceived change in competition 
regime, as well as with-in industry variations in profitability may serve as (imperfect) 
measures of environmental uncertainty. 
 The evidence was found to be consistent with the hypothesis stating that there is an 
overall positive and significant relation between environmental uncertainty and the use of 
performance pay in the sense that the likelihood of adopting pay-for-performance increases 
with firms’ ability to produce product innovations, in particular when the majority of the 
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workforce is involved in the pay-for-performance schemes. However, not only did we 
conjecture that there an overall positive and significant relation between environmental 
uncertainty and the use of pay-for-performance, we also added the prediction that the 
strength of the correlation between environmental uncertainty and the use of performance 
pay is sector dependent, so that firms in more “dynamic” sectors are more likely to use 
performance pay than those in less “dynamic” sectors, given a certain level of uncertainty. It 
was concluded that if firms produce innovations to an increasing degree of novelty, they are 
much more likely to adopt pay-for-performance involving the majority of the workforce and 
that this relationship was found to be the strongest for firms affiliated to high knowledge-
intensity sectors. Moreover, we found that the relationship between the level of adoption of 
pay-for-performance schemes and uncertainty  measured as within-industry variance in 
profits  becomes increasingly strong, when the level of knowledge intensity increases. 
 With respect to the hypothesis claiming that delegation and environmental uncertainty 
are positively correlated, we found support for this claim to the extent that if firms face 
more uncertain environments, then they are more likely to use delegation of responsibility, 
conditional on the observation that delegation involves the majority of the workforce. 
Although the parameter for the measure of within-industry variance in profitability turned 
out not to be significant (albeit positive) in explaining the use of delegation in firms, the 
opposite prediction from standard agency theory (a negative relation) found no support in 
the available evidence.  
 We also examined the multitasking agency hypothesis (the Holmström-Milgrom 
hypothesis) which states that, as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted. We 
found no evidence of such a relationship. First, we found that the parameter for within-
industry variance in profitability was positive (although not significant). Second, we found 
some evidence consistent with the view that firms which are placed in environments 
characterized by high uncertainty will restrict the activities that their employees can engage 
in less than those that are placed in low uncertainty environments. In this context, we found 
that firms with the ability to produce (uncertain) innovations are more prone to adopt quality 
circles and planned job rotation. Moreover, we found the final proxy for uncertainty, an 
increased level of competition, to affect positively the likelihood of adopting planned job 
rotation. Multitasking adds to the difficulty of accurately measuring input performance, and 
makes it more attractive to substitute output-based pay for direct monitoring and other ways 
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of restricting the agent. Given that output-based pay is preferred under these circumstances, 
there is little reason to implement such restrictions. On the contrary, we conjecture that 
“dynamic” firms often stimulate multitasking for reasons of knowledge-integration and 
sharing.  
 
V. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The questions from the DISKO survey that are used in this paper 
 
1. How large a share of the firm’s workforce is involved in following ways of organising 
work? (none, < 25%, 25%-50%, >50%, corresponding to a 4 point Lickert scale) 
 a. Delegation of responsibility [DR] 
 b  Performance pay (not piece work) [PPAY] 
 c. Quality circles [QC] 
 d. Planned job rotation [PLJ] 
 
2. Has the firm introduced new products/services during the period 1993-95 when excepting 
minor improvements of existing products? (yes/no) 
 
If the respondent answered yes to this question he/she was asked whether similar 
products/services could be found... 
 a. ...on the Danish market (yes/no) 
 b. ...on the world market (yes/no) 
If the respondent answered that a similar product could be found both on the Danish market 
and on the world market, the innovation variable was coded with the value of 1 (“new to the 
firm”). If respondent answered that a similar product could be found on the world market, 
but not on the Danish market, the innovation variable was coded with the value of 2 (“new 
to the country”). If the respondent answered that similar product could neither be found on 
the Danish market, nor on the world market, the innovation variable was coded with the 
value of 3 ("new to the world"). If the respondent answered no the first question under (4), 
the variable was assigned with the value of 0 (non-innovator). 
 
3. To which extent has competition from other firms changed during recent years? 
a. Strongly decreased 
b. Somewhat decreased 
c. Unchanged 
d. Somewhat increased 
e. Strongly increased 
If the respondent answered “strongly decreased”, the variable was coded with the value of 
zero, while the variable was coded with the value of four, in the case where respondent 
answered “strongly increased”. 
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Appendix 2:  The Assignment of Industries/Firms Into Three Sectoral Categories 
 
 No. Industry Sector No. Industry Sector 
 1 Production etc. of meat and meat products Med-KI 43 Sale of motor vehicles, motorcycles etc. Low-KI
 2 Manufacture of dairy products Med-KI 44 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles Low-KI
 3 Manufacture of other food products Med-KI 45 Service stations Low-KI
 4 Manufacture of beverages Med-KI 46 Ws. of agricul. raw materials, live animals Med-KI
 5 Manufacture of tobacco products Med-KI 47 Ws. of food, beverages and tobacco Med-KI
 6 Manufacture of textiles and textile products Low-KI 48 Ws. of household goods Med-KI
 7 Mfr. of wearing apparel; dressing etc. of fur Low-KI 49 Ws. of wood and construction materials Med-KI
 8 Mfr. of leather and leather products Low-KI 50 Ws. of other raw mat. and semimanufactures Med-KI
 9 Mfr. of wood and wood products Low-KI 51 Ws. of machinery, equipment and supplies Med-KI
 10 Mfr. of pulp, paper and paper products Low-KI 52 Commission trade and other wholesale trade Med-KI
 11 Publishing of newspapers Low-KI 53 Re. sale of food in non-specialised stores Low-KI
 12 Publishing activities, excl. newspapers Low-KI 54 Re. sale of food in specialised stores Low-KI
 13 Printing activities etc. Low-KI 55 Department stores Low-KI
 14 Mfr. of refined petroleum products etc. Med-KI 56 Retail sale of phar. Goods, cosmetic art. etc. Low-KI
 15 Mfr. of chemical raw materials High-KI 57 Re. sale of clothing, footwear etc. Low-KI
 16 Mfr. of paints, soap, cosmetics, etc. Med-KI 58 Re. sale of furniture, household appliances Low-KI
 17 Mfr. of pharmaceuticals etc. High-KI 59 Re. sale in other specialised stores Low-KI
 18 Mfr. of plastics and synthetic rubber Med-KI 60 Repair of personal and household goods Low-KI
 19 Mfr. of glass and ceramic goods etc. Low-KI 61 Hotels etc. Low-KI
 20 Mfr. of cement, bricks, concrete ind. etc. Med-KI 62 Restaurants etc. Low-KI
 21 Mfr. of basic metals Med-KI 63 Transport via railways and buses Low-KI
 22 Mfr. construction materials of metal etc. Med-KI 64 Taxi operation and coach services Low-KI
 23 Mfr. of hand tools, metal packaging etc. Low-KI 65 Freight transport by road and via pipelines Low-KI
 24 Mfr. of marine engines, compressors etc. High-KI 66 Water transport Low-KI
 25 Mfr. of other general purpose machinery High-KI 67 Air transport Low-KI
 26 Mfr. of agricultural and forestry machinery High-KI 68 Cargo handling, harbours etc.; travel agencies Low-KI
 27 Mfr. of machinery for industries etc. High-KI 69 Monetary intermediation High-KI
 28 Mfr. of domestic appliances n.e.c. Med-KI 70 Other financial intermediation High-KI
 29 Mfr. of office machinery and computers High-KI 71 Insurance and pension funding High-KI
 30 Mfr. of radio and communication equipment etc. High-KI 72 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediates High-KI
 31 Mfr. of medical and optical instruments etc. High-KI 73 Letting of own property Low-KI
 32 Building and repairing of ships and boats Med-KI 74 Real estate agents etc. Low-KI
 33 Mfr. of transport equipment excl. ships, etc. Med-KI 75 Renting of machinery and equipment etc. Low-KI
 34 Mfr. of furniture Low-KI 76 Computer and related activity High-KI
 35 Mfr. of toys, gold and silver articles etc. Low-KI 77 Research and development High-KI
 36 General contractors Low-KI 78 Legal activities High-KI
 37 Bricklaying Low-KI 79 Accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities High-KI
 38 Install. of electrical wiring and fittings Low-KI 80 Consulting engineers, architects etc. High-KI
 39 Plumbing Low-KI 81 Advertising High-KI
 40 Joinery installation Low-KI 82 Building-cleaning activities Low-KI
 41 Painting and glazing Low-KI 83 Other business services High-KI
 42 Other construction works Low-KI     
 
Note: Low-KI = low knowledge-intensity sectors; Med-KI = medium knowledge-intensity sectors; High-KI = 
high knowledge-intensity sectors.   
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Appendix 3:  The Assignment of Industries/Firms Into Profit Variance Categories 
 
 No. Industry N Variance No. Industry N Variance
 V1 Production etc. of meat and meat products (i1) 30 0.024 V36 Painting and glazing (i41) 66 0.018
 V2 Manufacture of dairy products (i2) 27 0.047 V37 Other construction works (i42) 33 0.010
 V3 Manufacture of other food products (i3)  Manufacture of tobacco products (i5) 129 0.043 V38 Sale of motor vehicles, motorcycles etc. (i43) 243 0.061
 V4 Manufacture of beverages (i4) 15 0.011 V39 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles (i44) Service stations (i45) 51 0.008
 V5 Manufacture of textiles and textile products (i6) 69 0.042 V40 Ws. of agricul. raw materials, live animals (i46) 48 0.026
 V6 Mfr. of wearing apparel; dressing etc. of fur (i7) Mfr. of leather and leather products (i8) 48 0.070 V41 Ws. of food, beverages and tobacco (i47) 96 0.065
 V7 Mfr. of wood and wood products (i9) 75 0.022 V42 Ws. of household goods (i48) 150 0.037
 V8 Mfr. of pulp, paper and paper products (i10) 66 0.085 V43 Ws. of wood and construction materials (i49) 51 0.051
 V9 Publishing of newspapers (i11) Publishing activities, excl. newspapers (i12) 42 0.006 V44 Ws. of other raw mat. and semimanufactures (i50) 87 0.034
 V10 Printing activities etc. (i13) 75 0.065 V45 Ws. of machinery, equipment and supplies (i51) 336 0.049
 V11 Mfr. of refined petroleum products etc. (i14) Mfr. of chemical raw materials (i15) 24 0.030 V46 Commission trade and other wholesale trade (i52) 24 0.015
 V12 Mfr. of paints, soap, cosmetics, etc. (i16) 63 0.036 V47 Re. sale of food in non-specialised stores (i53) Department stores (i55) 63 0.032
 V13 Mfr. of pharmaceuticals etc. (i17) 27 0.035 V48 Re. sale of food in specialised stores (i54) 15 0.004
 V14 Mfr. of plastics and synthetic rubber (i18) 135 0.023 V49 Retail sale of phar. goods, cosmetic art. etc. (i56) 120 0.007
 V15 Mfr. of glass and ceramic goods etc. (i19) Mfr. of cement, bricks, concrete ind. etc. (i20) 81 0.024 V50 Re. sale of clothing, footwear etc. (i57) 78 0.029
 V16 Mfr. of basic metals (i21) 69 0.045 V51 Re. sale of furniture, household appliances (i58) Repair of personal and household goods (i60) 90 0.019
 V17 Mfr. construction materials of metal etc. (i22) 84 0.018 V52 Re. sale in other specialised stores (i59) 51 0.018
 V18 Mfr. of hand tools, metal packaging etc. (i23) 102 0.030 V53 Hotels etc. (i61) 63 0.086
 V19 Mfr. of marine engines, compressors etc. (i)24 54 0.033 V54 Restaurants etc. (i62) 39 0.010
 V20 Mfr. of other general purpose machinery (i)25 105 0.057 V55 Transport via railways and buses (i63) 18 0.015
 V21 Mfr. of agricultural and forestry machinery (i26) 27 0.082 V56 Taxi operation and coach services (i64) 30 0.003
 V22 Mfr. of machinery for industries etc. (i27) 108 0.019 V57 Freight transport by road and via pipelines (i65) 165 0.008
 V23 Mfr. of domestic appliances n.e.c. (i28) 30 0.036 V58 Water transport (i66) Air transport (i67) 15 0.107
 V24 Mfr. of office machinery and computers (i29) 84 0.068 V59 Cargo handling, harbours etc.; travel agencies (i68) 96 0.028
 V25 Mfr. of radio and communication equipment etc. (i30) 51 0.060 V60 
Monetary intermediation (i69) 
Other financial intermediation (i70) 
Insurance and pension funding (i71) 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediates (i72) 
15 0.089
 V26 Mfr. of medical and optical instruments etc. (i31) 90 0.045 V61 Letting of own property (i73) Real estate agents etc. (i74) 18 0.012
 V27 Building and repairing of ships and boats (i32) 24 0.101 V62 Renting of machinery and equipment etc. (i75) 18 0.633
 V28 Mfr. of transport equipment excl. ships, etc. (i33) 60 0.091 V63 Computer and related activity (i76) 69 0.023
 V29 Mfr. of furniture (i34) 156 0.022 V64 Research and development (i77) 3 0.025
 V30 Mfr. of toys, gold and silver articles etc. (i35) 36 0.017 V65 Legal activities (i78) 3 0.000
 V31 General contractors (i36) 177 0.030 V66 Accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities (i79) 33 0.003
 V32 Bricklaying (i37) 36 0.019 V67 Consulting engineers, architects etc. (i80) 90 0.019
 V33 Install. of electrical wiring and fittings (i38) 114 0.014 V68 Advertising (i81) 18 0.006
 V34 Plumbing (i39) 66 0.008 V69 Building-cleaning activities (i82) 45 0.007
 V35 Joinery installation (i40) 84 0.015 V70 Other business services (i83) 27 0.079
 
Note: The numbers in brackets (i1..i70) refers to the industry number in Appendix Table 2.  
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Appendix Table A1: Marginal effects from probit, adoption pay-for-performance of across 
993 Danish firms 
 
  PPAY=0 PPAY=1 PPAY=2 PPAY=3  
 LOW_KI 0.190 -0.032 -0.028 -0.130  
 MEDIUM_KI 0.162 -0.027 -0.024 -0.110  
 HIGH_KI 0.196 -0.033 -0.029 -0.134  
 SIZE -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003  
 SUBSID -0.083 0.014 0.012 0.057  
 INNO -0.065 0.011 0.010 0.044  
 COMP 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  
 PROFITVAR -1.214 0.205 0.181 0.828  
 
 
Appendix Table A2: Marginal effects from probit, adoption of delegation of responsability 
across 993 Danish firms 
 
  DR=0 DR=1 DR=2 DR=3  
 LOW_KI -0.111 -0.124 -0.009 0.245  
 MEDIUM_KI -0.146 -0.162 -0.012 0.320  
 HIGH_KI -0.158 -0.175 -0.013 0.346  
 SIZE -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.004  
 SUBSID -0.021 -0.024 -0.002 0.047  
 INNO -0.012 -0.013 -0.001 0.026  
 COMP -0.016 -0.018 -0.001 0.036  
 PROFITVAR -0.267 -0.297 -0.023 0.587  
 
 
Appendix Table A3: Marginal effects from probit, adoption quality circles of across 993 
Danish firms 
 
  QC=0 QC=1 QC=2 QC=3  
 LOW_KI 0.226 -0.066 -0.068 -0.092  
 MEDIUM_KI 0.210 -0.061 -0.063 -0.086  
 HIGH_KI 0.115 -0.034 -0.035 -0.047  
 SIZE -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002  
 SUBSID -0.111 0.032 0.033 0.045  
 INNO -0.039 0.011 0.012 0.016  
 COMP -0.012 0.004 0.004 0.005  
 PROFITVAR -0.524 0.153 0.156 0.214  
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Appendix Table A4: Marginal effects from probit, adoption of planned job rotation across 
993 Danish firms 
 
  PJR=0 PLJ=1 PLJ=2 PLJ=3  
 LOW_KI 0.306 -0.126 -0.091 -0.089  
 MEDIUM_KI 0.248 -0.102 -0.073 -0.072  
 HIGH_KI 0.283 -0.117 -0.084 -0.082  
 SIZE -0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002  
 SUBSID -0.055 0.023 0.016 0.016  
 INNO -0.060 0.025 0.018 0.018  
 COMP -0.033 0.014 0.010 0.010  
 PROFITVAR -0.469 0.194 0.139 0.137  
 
 
Appendix Table A5: Marginal effects from probit estimation with sector-specific  
slopes, adoption of pay-for-performance across 993 Danish firms 
 
  PPAY=0 PPAY=1 PPAY=2 PPAY=3  
 INTERCEPT Low-KI 0.233 -0.040 -0.035 -0.157  
  Medium-KI 0.027 -0.005 -0.004 -0.018  
  High-KI 0.516 -0.088 -0.078 -0.349  
 SIZE Low-KI 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  
  Medium-KI -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002  
  High-KI -0.009 0.002 0.001 0.006  
 SUBSID Low-KI -0.127 0.022 0.019 0.086  
  Medium-KI -0.032 0.006 0.005 0.022  
  High-KI -0.111 0.019 0.017 0.075  
 INNO Low-KI -0.056 0.010 0.009 0.038  
  Medium-KI -0.050 0.009 0.008 0.034  
  High-KI -0.104 0.018 0.016 0.070  
 COMP Low-KI -0.018 0.003 0.003 0.012  
  Medium-KI 0.047 -0.008 -0.007 -0.032  
  High-KI -0.040 0.007 0.006 0.027  
 PROFITVAR Low-KI -0.403 0.069 0.061 0.273  
  Medium-KI -2.687 0.461 0.407 1.820  
  High-KI -3.641 0.624 0.551 2.466  
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- Competence building and inter-firm dynamics 
- The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation 
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The empirical and policy issues relate to the nexus technology, productivity, 
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Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation. 
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we compare regions and nations? 
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